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Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
in the Employment at Will Setting:

Limiting the Employer's Manner of Discharge
INTRODUCTION
For most of this century private sector employees in the United States

have had little or no legal protection of their job security because of the
common law 'employment it will' rule which allows an employer to discharge
an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all.' This
rule has been criticized harshly in recent years by a host of commentators
who have asserted that it gives employers too much discretion and allows

them to take unfair advantage of employees. 2 In response to this criticism,
many state courts have used public policy, tort, and contract principles to
create exceptions to the traditional rule. These exceptions attempt to provide
some protection against abusive or retaliatory discharges for these otherwise
vulnerable employees. 3 The legal justification of the traditional employment
at will rule rests upon the premise that under the contract the employee is

not bound for any specific period of time; therefore the employer also should
be free to terminate the relationship at any time. 4 Many modern courts now
reject, at least in part, this mutuality principle in favor of the more realistic

1. The rule was formulated by H.G. Wood in his 1877 treatise on master-servant relationships. H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON Tm LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877). Its rapid
adoption by many state courts in the late 1800's has been attributed by many commentators
to the attempt to facilitate economic and industrial development during the industrial revolution.
See, e.g., Summers, Individual ProtectionAgainst Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62
VA. L. REv. 481 (1976); Note, Job Security for the At Will Employee: ContractualRight of
Dischargefor Cause, 57 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 697, 700 (1981); Note, ProtectingAt Will Employees
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REV.
1816, 1824-28 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Good Faith]; Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job
Security, 26 STAN. L. Rv. 335, 342-43, 346-47 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Job Security].
2. See, e.g., Blades, Employment At Will vs. IndividualFreedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. RaV. 1404, 1404-05 (1967); Peck, Unjust Discharges
From Employment: A Necessary Change In the Law, 40 Omo ST. L.J. 1, 8-9; Weyand, Present
Status of Individual Employee Rights, N.Y.U. 22D ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 171 (1970);
Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively DischargedEmployee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Abusive Discharge]; Job Security, supra note 1; Summers, supra
note 1 (advocating statutory reform); Comment, Wrongful Discharge of Employees Terminable
at Will-A New Theory of Liability in Arkansas, 34 ARK. L. REv. 729 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Wrongful Discharge];Comment, Limiting the Employer's Absolute Right of Discharge: Can
Kansas Courts Meet the Challenge?, 29 U. KAN. L. REV. 267 (1981); Note, Limiting the Right
to Terminate At Will-Have the Courts Forgotten the Employer?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 201
(1982).
3. See Annot., 12 A.L.R.4m 544 (1982).
4. Good Faith, supra note 1, at 1819; Note, supra note 2, at 208.
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view that, despite the employee's ability to change jobs, the employer's

obvious bargaining power advantage necessitates some job protection for
the employee. 5 Judicial recognition of this inequality of power in the employment relationship also serves as the underpinning for another relatively
new creation of the courts-the action for intentional infliction of emotional
6
distress.
Even more than the wrongful discharge exceptions to the at will doctrine,

the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is a response by the
courts to academic commentary and suggestions. 7 The action, as defined in

the 1965 Restatement (Second) of Torts,8 has been adopted in most jurisdictions, 9 and allows recovery for intentionally inflicted severe emotional

5. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 I11.2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); Blades,

supra note 2, at 1408-13; Abusive Discharge, supra note 2, at 1443-44; Job Security, supra
note 1, at 337-39.

6. See Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness:
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 42,
43 (1982).

7. The predominant articles which fostered adoption of this tort were Magruder, Mental
and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. Rv. 1033 (1936); Prosser,
Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REv. 874 (1939); and
Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 40 (1956).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
9. The following cases have adopted the Restatement (Second) § 46 formulation of the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress: American Road Serv. Co. v. Inmon, 394
So. 2d 361 (Ala. 1980); Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954); M.B.M. Co. v.
Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980); State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38
Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952); Rugg v. McCarty, 173 Colo. 170, 476 P.2d 753 (1970);
Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961); Amsden v. Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance

Co., 203 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1972); Dawson v. Associates Financial Serv. Co., 215 Kan. 814,
529 P.2d 104 (1974); Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148 (Me. 1979); George v.
Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244, 268 N.E.2d 915 (1971); Warren v. June's Mobile Home
Village & Sales, 66 Mich. App. 386, 239 N.W.2d 380 (1976); Hubbard v. United Press Int'l,
330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983); Pretsky v. Southwestern Bell Tel., 396 S.W.2d 566 (Mo. 1965)
(§ 46 language cited approvingly, but without discussion); Paasch v. Brown, 193 Neb. 368,
227 N.W.2d 402 (1975); Hume v. Bayer, 157 N.J. Super. 310, 428 A.2d 966 (1981);
Fischer v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 373 N.E.2d 1215, 402 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1978); Dickens v.
Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981); Breeden v. League Servs. Corp., 575 P.2d 1374
(Okla. 1978); Pakos v. Clark, 253 Or. 113, 453 P.2d 682 (1969); Papieves v. Lawrence, 437
Pa. 373, 263 A.2d 118 (1970); Hudson v. Zenith Engraving Co., 273 S.C. 766, 259 S.E.2d 812
(1979); Medlin v. Allied Inv. Co., 217 Tenn. 469, 398 S.W.2d 270 (1966); Samms v. Eccles,
11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961); Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145
(1974); Sheltra v. Smith, 136 Vt. 472, 392 A.2d 431 (1978); Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d
52, 530 P.2d 291 (1975); Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963) (adopting
§ 46 formulation except as to "reckless" actions).
The following jurisdictions recognize an independent tort for intentional infliction of emotional
harm without adopting the § 46 formulation: Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men of Washington, D.C., 70 App. D.C. 183, 105 F.2d 62 (1939) (adopting first Restatement formulation);
Pack v. Wise, 155 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 1963); First Nat'l Bank v. Bragdon, 84 S.D. 89, 167
N.W.2d 381 (1969).
Other jurisdictions are split on the question of adopting § 46, see Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Sheehan, 373 So. 2d 956 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. dismissed, 379 So. 2d 204 (1979); Gellert
v. Eastern Air Lines, 370 So. 2d 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), or have explicitly rejected §
46, Browning v. Browning, 584 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. App. 1979) (in the narrow case of interspousal
suits); Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967).
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distress when it results from extreme and outrageous conduct. This tort has
been used most effectively where the dominant party in an unequal legal
relationship has outrageously abused his position to the emotional detriment
of the weaker party.' 0 These same concerns provided the foundation for the
wrongful discharge action, and therefore it is not surprising that claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress often accompany suits for wrongful discharge. Both wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional
distress are still in their infancy." As these two doctrines change and mature,
sound adjudication of cases that involve both causes of action will depend
upon an understanding of how the two doctrines interact. The purpose of
this Note is to facilitate that understanding by determining the proper role
for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the context of firings from
at will contracts.
The first part of the Note examines the effects that the wrongful discharge
exception to the at will doctrine has had upon the behavior of employers,
and argues that the potential liability for wrongful discharge has led to
procedures that reduce abuses of power by employers. The second part of
the Note reveals the difficulties in defining the tort of intentional infliction
of eniotional distress and emphasizes the abuse of employer authority as a
guiding concern in the employment at will context. The third part of the
Note discusses the application of intentional infliction of emotional distress
in conjunction with the various wrongful discharge rules. This analysis concludes that intentional infliction of emotional distress can serve a useful
function in this context by regulating the conduct surrounding the discharge,
while the wrongful discharge action regulates the motivation for the firing.
I. POTENTIAL IMPACT ON EMPLOYER BEHAVIOR-A LOOK
AT THE EFFECTS OF THE WRONGFUL DISCHARGE LIMITATION
ON EMPLOYER POWER
Courts have created wrongful discharge exceptions to the at will doctrine
to protect at will employees from abuses of an employer's right to discharge
his employees.' 2 Before analyzing the utility of further limiting employer
behavior through application of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, it is helpful to examine the positive and negative effects of the
wrongful discharge action as a limitation of employer power. Initially, the
wrongful discharge action provides individual justice through damage awards
to unfairly discharged employees. At will employees as a group also benefit
indirectly through changes in employer behavior to avoid such damage judgments.

10. Givelber, supra note 6, at 43.
11. Palmateer,421 N.E.2d at 884 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
12. See supra notes 4 & 5 and accompanying text.
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As employers have become aware of the potential for liability for wrongful
discharge, their legal advisers have responded by publishing bulletins and
pamphlets to help employers decrease their exposure to both civil litigation
and liability in this area. 3 The warnings contained in these pamphlets normally focus on three general tactics to avoid the costs of litigation and the
potential liability resulting from discharges. First, the employer should avoid
implying that the job will be permanent by omitting any references to job
4
security from job applications, employee handbooks, and job interviews.'
Second, employers periodically should conduct honest and forthright performance appraisals. Each employee should be made aware of the results
of such evaluations. 5 This procedure provides evidence of the employee's
performance, while giving fair warning to the employee of any potential
problems. Finally, employers should provide procedures before and after
discipline and discharge situations to ensure that the employee's performance
was the primary basis for his termination, and that the evaluation of his
performance was arrived at fairly and not through the personal bias or
6
prejudice of the immediate supervisor.1
While these employer measures have been designed to protect the employer
from liability for wrongful discharge, they also provide some de facto protection for the nearly three quarters of the work force'7 employed at will.
In fact, if properly applied, these procedures can provide protection similar
to the just cause provisions that unionized employees possess under collective
bargaining agreements. These in-house procedures are likely to expose a high
percentage of unjust discharges at a time when they can be rectified by the
employer, thereby greatly reducing the high litigation costs that have provoked much of the criticism of the wrongful discharge action. However, the
expense of administering such procedures and the potential for unfounded
claims by disgruntled employees will continue to be unattractive costs for
the critics of the wrongful discharge action. These costs are not an unreasonable burden, given the importance of job security to the average employee' s
in today's increasingly specialized job market. 9 Furthermore, the costs of

13. Employment-at-Will: Reducing Liability, BULLETIN TO MANAGEMENT (BNA), No. 1666,
at 1, Feb. 25, 1982; HUMAN RESOURCES Div., INDIANA STATE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CHECKLIST
OF MEASURES TO MINIMIZE EMPLOYER ExPOSURE TO CIVIL LITIGATION BY AND LIABILITY TO AT-

WILL EMPLOYEES (1983) [hereinafter cited as CHECKLIST].
14. CHECKLIST, supra note 13.
15. Id. These frank evaluations may be unpleasant and even harmful to employee morale
in some instances. But the possible detrimental effects are outweighed by the need for fairness
to a worker who may not realize his precarious position regarding continued employment.
16. Id.
17. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.

DEP'T OF COMMERCE,

UNITED STATES 1984, at 440.
18. C. BRAINERD, M. HERMAN, G. PALMER, H.

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT

OF THE

PARNES & R. WILCOX, THE RELUCTANT JOB

CHANGER: STUDES IN WORK ATTACHMENTS AND ASPIRATIONS 61-68 (1962).

19. Id. at 153-57. Job security is particularly important to the middle-aged managerial
employees who are most commonly involved in these cases. The effects of being fired can be
particularly devastating because it is often difficult for these people to secure other employment.
The Employment-at-Will Issue, PERSONNEL MGT. (BNA) No. 544-2, at 21-25 (Dec. 2, 1982).
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these procedures and of wrongful discharge liability will certainly be passed
on to the consumer in many instances, thereby apportioning the risks of the
individual employee throughout the entire economy. 20
Despite its critics, it appears that the wrongful discharge exception is
succeeding in bringing a greater degree of job security to the workplace.
Moreover, contrary to what one might expect, courts are not likely to be
deluged with wrongful discharge claims if employers continue to respond by
instituting internal measures to assure fairness and resolve disputes without
recourse to the courts. 2' The apparent successes of the wrongful discharge
limitation suggest that proper application of intentional infliction of emotional distress can provide even greater incentive for employers not to abuse
their authority, especially in this inherently stressful discharge situation.
II.

THm DILEmmA OF DEFINING THE TORT OF

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

Before delving into the judicial uses of the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress in the at will employment context, it is necessary to
define this cause of action. Normally, constructing a definition entails little
more than reference to the Restatement, and the use of cases to illustrate
each of the necessary elements. However, a recent article by Daniel Givelber
correctly concludes that this traditional analysis does not yield a satisfactory
definition of this unique tort.22
A.

"The Tort of Outrage"

The Restatement definition of intentional infliction of emotional distress
consists of four elements:21 "(1) the defendant must act intentionally or
recklessly, (2) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous, and (3) the

20. The existence of such proceedings can also provide a means for speedy disposition of
frivolous claims. A court can quickly review the facts revealed in the record of such hearings.
In fact, in at least one case the existence of a three-tier appeals procedure has been found to
preclude a finding of outrageousness in a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Lekich v. International Business Machs., 469 F. Supp. 485, 488 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
21. Good Faith, supra note 1, at 1834.
22. Givelber, supra note 6, at 46.
23. This section of the Restatement (Second) reads as follows:
Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly

causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for

such bodily harm.
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject
to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
(a) to any member of such person's immediate family who is present
at the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress
results in bodily harm.
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conduct must be the cause, (4) of severe emotional distress." 24 Givelber
argues that these requirements tend to distill to a single element: "extreme
and outrageous conduct.' '25 The intent requirement merges into the defendant's conduct, as it does in most intentional torts which look not to subjective
intent, but rather to whether the defendant intended to commit an act from
which some injury is substantially certain to result. Fulfillment of the causation and injury requirements also seems to depend heavily upon the outrageous character of the defendant's conduct, because of the difficulty of
proving the existence of an actual emotional injury or its cause. Most courts
avoid these dilemmas by inferring an injury from conduct that is so out26
rageous that the reasonable person would suffer extreme emotional distress.
The merger of these elements is foreshadowed in comment j to section 46,
which states: "severe distress must be proved; but in many cases the extreme
and outrageous character of the defendant's conduct is in itself important
27
evidence that the distress has existed."
Because of its heavy emphasis on the severity of the defendant's behavior,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, also called the "tort of outrage,"
is a unique and somewhat amorphous cause of action. Unlike most intentional torts, the relative ease of establishing injury is not counterbalanced
by any specific definition of the behavior which will lead to liability. 28 Instead,
liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress will arise whenever
the defendant's conduct is found to be outrageous. The Restatement's description of the prohibited conduct provides very little guidance to the
potential defendant: "Liability has been found only where the conduct has
been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community. ' 29 However, unpredictable standards
can be justified where they provide necessary protection to potential litigants,
as is evident from the unpredictable but well-recognized reasonableness standard in negligence actions.
B.

Punitive Characterof the Tort of Outrage

The outrageousness standard also gives the tort of outrage an unusual
punitive nature. 0 Unlike other torts which compensate victims for their
injuries, damages for the tort of outrage often depend more on the character
of the defendant's conduct than the extent of the plaintiff's injury." The

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Givelber, supra note 6, at 46.
Id. at 42-43.
Id. at 46-49.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
Givelber, supra note 6, at 51.
RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
Givelber, supra note 6, at 54.
Id.

§ 46 comment j (1965).
§ 46 comment

d (1965).
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emotional damages awarded normally exceed both the plaintiff's out-ofpocket expenses due to the injury and any economic goal which the defendant
32
may have sought through his outrageous conduct. Therefore, in many cases
emotional damages serve the policy of deterrence which also underlies punitive damages. 33 This punitive character of intentional infliction of emotional
the way some courts apply this tort in
distress is critical to understanding
34
the wrongful discharge situation.

C.

Guidepostsfor Use of the Tort of Outrage
in the Employment at Will Setting

The task of applying the vague standard of this often punitive tort falls
primarily upon judges. The comments to Restatement section 46 provide an
important gate-keeping role to the judge who must "determine, in the first
instance, whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as

so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily
so. ' '31 Most courts have actively exercised their discretion in keeping such
suits away from a jury. 36 This activism probably can be attributed to judicial
recognition of the emotionalism inherent in these cases, and a fear that
sympathetic juries will be too willing to punish defendants for behavior that
is distasteful but not outrageous. 37 In this attempt to avoid jury verdicts
based on passion and prejudice, the courts can find little help in the circular
comments to section 46.38 Judges are therefore left with the unenviable task
of applying a very general term to the infinite variety of conduct that may

cause emotional distress.
Despite their failure to clearly define outrageousness, the Restatement's

comments do suggest the contexts in which a suit for intentional infliction
of emotional distress is most appropriate. Comment e states: "The extreme

and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from an abuse by the

32. Id. at 54 n.63.
33. Id. at 52.
34. See, e.g., Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 289 S.E.2d 692, 702-03 (W. Va. 1982).
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment h (1965).
36. See, e.g., Lekich v. International Business Machs., 469 F. Supp. 485, 488 (E.D. Pa.
1979); Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344, 347 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Food Fair,
Inc. v. Anderson, 382 So. 2d 150, 153 (Fla. App. 1980).
37. See Givelber, supra note 6, at 52. Also courts recognize that "[tihe rough edges of
society are still in need of a good deal of filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs must
necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language,
and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind. There is no occasion for
the law to intervene in every case where some one's feelings are hurt." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1965).
38. For example, the comment on extreme and outrageous conduct states that "[t]he liability
clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or
other trivialities." The comment also gives the following ephemeral guidance: "Generally, the
case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would
arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim 'Outrageous!' " RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1965).
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actor of a position, or a relation with the other, which gives him actual or
apparent authority over the other, or power to affect his interests." 3 9 Even
though the comments and illustrations in the Restatement do not specifically
mention the employer-employee relationship, commentators and courts alike
have cited this comment to justify use of this tort in the employment at will
context.40 In fact, the employee's entire case may hinge on a judge's willingness to consider the immense power that the employer holds over the
employee's livelihood and the stressful impact on the employee when the
4
employer wields that power as a weapon of coercion. '
Courts that refuse to weigh the coercive element of the employer's behavior
commonly cite comment g which states: "The actor is never liable ... where
he has done no more than to insist upon his legal rights in a permissible
way, even though he is well aware that such insistence is certain to cause
emotional distress." '42 This language has led some courts to conclude that
the employer could not be liable for intentional infliction of emotional
distress unless he was also liable for wrongful discharge, since by firing the
employee the employer did no more than exercise his legal rights.4 3 This
argument has been rejected by other courts that recognize that the tort of
44
outrage also can arise from conduct surrounding the discharge.
The final relevant comment to the employment at will situation focuses
not on the employer's position to inflict stress but on the employee's susceptibility to that stress. Comment f states: "The extreme and outrageous
character of the conduct may arise from the actor's knowledge that the
other is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress, by reason of some
physical or mental condition or peculiarity. ' 45 This comment has been used
only sparingly in at will firings, 46 but it should be given more emphasis in
light of the employer's knowledge that the employee already has sustained
the emotional trauma of a discharge. Each of these comments should be
considered to help provide some structure to the otherwise amoeba-like
concept of outrageousness as it is applied in the employment at will context.

III.

MOTIVE VS. MANNER: THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

A determination of the proper role for the tort of outrage in the at will
employment context requires a careful comparison to the wrongful discharge

39. Id. at comment e.
40. Givelber, supra note 6, at 43; Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, 2 Cal. 3d 493, 498, 468

P.2d 216, 218, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 90 (1970); Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash.
2d 735, 741, 565 P.2d 1173, 1176 (1977).
41. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment g (1965).

43. Novosel, 495 F. Supp. at 346-47; Brooks v. Carolina Tel. & Tel., 56 N.C. App. 801,
805, 290 S.E.2d 370, 372 (1982).
44. M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 596 S.W.2d 681, 688 (Ark. 1980). See infra notes 104-12 and
accompanying text.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment f (1965).
46. See, e.g., Alcorn, 468 P.2d at 218-19 (involving susceptibility due to racial status);
Contreras, 565 P.2d at 1177 (involving susceptibility due to national origin).
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action, which is the primary protection for at will employees. The use of
intentional infliction of emotional distress by at will employees originated
as a response either to the lack of a wrongful discharge remedy, or to the
limits on damages for wrongful discharge. Despite these origins as an attempt
to circumvent the limits of the wrongful discharge doctrine, a close analysis
of the two actions reveals a subtle distinction that must be understood to
assure proper adjudication of cases involving both causes of action. The
wrongful discharge exceptions to the at will doctrine limit the reasons or
motives for which an employee may be terminated, while the claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress limits the manner in which a
discharge may be effectuated.
This distinction between the two causes of action has been explained most
clearly in cases involving federal legislative preemption of state tort claims
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 47 In these preemption cases,
the plaintiff has either failed to recover under the statute, 48 or is seeking a
remedy beyond that allowed by the statute. 49 The United States Supreme
Court decided this preemption issue with regard to the National Labor
50
Relations Act in Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters Local 25.
In that case, the plaintiff Richard T. Hill was a member of Local 25 of the
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America. Hill sued the
union in state court for damages for breach of contract and alleged discrimination against him because of his dissident intra-union political activities. The intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was based on the
union's alleged campaign against him. Hill alleged that the campaign included
"frequent public ridicule," "incessant verbal abuse," threats, intimidation,
and "refusals to refer him to jobs in accordance with the rules of the hiring
hall." 51The state court sustained a demurrer to discrimination and contract

47. There are several federal statutes which limit the employer's right to discharge employees
in areas where abuses have been common: for example, the National Labor Relations Act of
1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(3) (1982), prohibits discharges in retaliation for union organizing
activity. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982), prohibits
employee terminations which discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Specific federal protections against retaliatory discharges include the Consumer Credit
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1982) (prohibiting discharges of those whose wages are
garnished for indebtedness); the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1982)
(discharge of those exercising rights under the Act is illegal); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982) (protecting older workers from retaliatory
discharge); the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1982) (illegal
to discharge anyone exercising rights under the Act); 38 U.S.C. § 2021 (1982) (granting returning
veterans the right to return to their former jobs and prohibiting discharge for one year).
48. This situation is analogous to the application of intentional infliction of emotional
distress in states which refuse to recognize the wrongful discharge action, or even where the
plaintiff has failed to win a wrongful discharge claim in states which recognize the action. See
infra text accompanying notes 78-117.
49. This situation is analogous to cases where the plaintiff has won under one of the
wrongful discharge theories, and is seeking further damages by claiming intentional infliction
of emotional distress. See infra text accompanying notes 118-61.
50. 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
51. Id. at 293.
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claims on the ground that federal law preempted state jurisdiction over them,
but allowed the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim to go to
52
trial.
The union appealed the plaintiff's verdict, alleging that the jurisdiction
of the National Labor Relations Act preempted the plaintiff's state tort
action. 53 The Court focused on whether concurrent state court jurisdiction
54
posed a realistic threat of interference with the federal regulatory scheme.
To decide that issue, the Court had to determine whether intentional infliction
of emotional distress regulated conduct that was already protected by the
National Labor Relations Act." The Court concluded that Congress did not
intend to preempt state court jurisdiction for this tort because: (1) the state
has a substantial interest in regulating the challenged conduct,5 6 and (2) it
is possible that "the state tort [could] be either unrelated to employment
discrimination or a function of the particularly abusive manner in which
the discrimination is accomplished or threatened rather than a function of
the actual or threatened discrimination itself."15 7 Thus, the Supreme Court
recognized that two separate actions could arise from the course of employment discrimination alleged in Farmer. The first action would involve
the employment discrimination itself. The second action, for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, would be based on the outrageous manner
in which the discrimination was implemented.
This distinction between the motive and manner of discharge has also
been applied in relation to wrongful discharge actions. In Magnuson v.
Burlington Northern, Inc., 58 the plaintiff was fired for his alleged negligence
in causing a head-on train collision. 9 Magnuson attempted to avoid the
limited wrongful discharge remedies under the Railway Labor Act by basing
his suit on intentional infliction of emotional distress, 6° thereby fitting his

52. Id. The jury rendered a verdict for plaintiff for $7,500 actual damages and $175,000
punitive damages. Id.at 294.
53. Id. at 295.
54. Id.at 305.

55. Discrimination in hiring hall referrals constitutes an unfair labor practice under §
8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the NLRA. Farmer, 430 U.S. at 303 n.l1.
56. Farmer, 430 U.S. at 304.
57. Id.at 305 (emphasis added). The jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff was vacated,
however, because there was no appropriate instruction distinguishing between the evidence
relevant to the employer's discriminatory labor practices (which are preempted by the NLRB)
and the harassment, public ridicule, and verbal abuse relevant to the outrageousness claim. It
was therefore impossible to determine on which evidence the damages were based. The Court
remanded the case to decide whether the manner of defendant's discriminatory practices was
outrageous. Id. at 307. On remand, the court of appeals reversed and judgment was rendered
for defendant because the conduct on which the outrageousness claim depended was a series
of threats that he would be deprived of his ability to earn a living as a carpenter. As such,
these were matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. Hill v. United Brotherhood
of Carpenters Local 25, 49 Cal. App. 3d 614, 122 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1975).
58. 576 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978).
59. Magnuson, 576 F.2d at 1368.

60. The plaintiff claimed that he was the victim of a conspiracy among railroad personnel
to place responsibility for the crash on him. The conspiracy was allegedly effected through
abuse of the railroad's investigatory process.
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claim within the exception created by Farmer.6' The court, however, found
that the tort claim was preempted by the Railway Labor Act because the
plaintiff's "emotional distress was an incident of the wrongful discharge,
rather than a result of an alleged conspiracy. ' 62 The court also stated "Et]he
alleged evil motivation of the defendants would have caused him no legal
injury if he had either not been discharged or if his discharge was not
wrongful." 63
Judge Bonsal, in his dissent, did not agree that the plaintiff's emotional
distress resulted solely from his discharge. Judge Bonsai apparently felt that
the acts of the defendant's employees in blaming the plaintiff for this tragedy,
even without the discharge, were sufficient to avoid a directed verdict on
the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.64 His dissent emphasized the distinction made in Farmer: "The gist of appellant's case is
not that he was wrongfully discharged but the 'particularly abusive manner
in which it was accomplished.' "65 While they reached different factual
conclusions, both opinions in Magnuson clearly recognized the difference
between the employer's motivation for the discharge, which is the issue in
wrongful discharge actions, and the manner used by the employer to carry
out the termination, which is the basis of suits for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
A further illustration of this distinction is presented by Viestenz v. Fleming
Cos." In Viestenz, the plaintiff alleged that he was pressured into admitting
that he stole merchandise from the employer's store, and then was discharged
for that admission. 67 The district court dismissed the plaintiff's action for
wrongful discharge because, as a unionized employee, he could bring such
an action only under the collective bargaining agreement. 68 Unlike the courts
in some states, 69 however, neither the trial court nor the appellate court
concluded its analysis at this point. Instead, both courts went on to consider
whether the emotional distress claimed by the plaintiff resulted from the
actual or threatened loss of employment, or from the particularly abusive

61. Magnuson, 576 F.2d at 1368-69.
62. Id.at 1369.
63. Id. The court also states: "Every employee who believes he has a legitimate grievance

will doubtless have some emotional anguish occasioned by his belief that he has been wronged.
Artful pleading cannot conceal the reality that the gravamen of the complaint is wrongful
discharge." Id.
64. Id. at 1371-72.
65. Id. at 1371.
66. 681 F.2d 699 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 972 (1982).
67. Viestenz, 681 F.2d at 700-01. The alleged pressure tactics included threats of discharge,
union black balling, and subjection to a court-ordered polygraph if the plaintiff did not admit
to the thefts. Id. at 701.
68. Id.at 701.
69. E.g., Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Daniel
v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320, 620 P.2d 699 (Ct. App. 1980); Brooks v. Carolina Tel.

& Tel., 56 N.C. App. 801, 290 S.E.2d 370 (1982).
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manner in which the discharge was accomplished or threatened.70 The district
court allowed a jury verdict on the claim of outrage to stand.7' The appellate
court reversed, reasoning that the plaintiff's harm "resulted from the fact
of his discharge, rather than from any improper conduct of [the defendant].''72 The emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was due to the
embarrassment and financial concerns caused by the discharge itself. Had
the plaintiff's distress resulted from the outrageous manner of the discharge,
however, he probably would have recovered under the tort of outrage. While
none of these three cases actually resulted in liability for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, each court distinguished between the conduct that is
relevant in a wrongful discharge action and the conduct that underlies the
tort of outrage. The wrongful discharge action depends solely on the validity
of the employer's motivation or reason for the discharge. Therefore, any
other conduct which surrounds the dismissal should be weighed to determine
whether the employer's manner of executing the discharge was outrageous.
The importance of this distinction between the motivation and the manner
of the discharge cannot be overemphasized. The outrageousness standard is
vague and very difficult to meet.73 In the at will employment setting courts
must closely scrutinize each allegedly improper act by the employer in light
of the employer's position of authority over the plaintiff if any employee
is to have a fair chance of meeting the stringent standard. 74 When courts
make conclusory decisions concerning ourtageousness without considering
what specific conduct should enter the calculation, they often fail to analyze
75
the most stressful and most outrageous aspects of the employer's conduct.

70. Viestenz, 681 F.2d at 703.

71. However, the judge did reduce by one half the actual and punitive damages awarded
from $5,000 and $50,000 to $2,500 and $25,000. Id. at 702.
72. Id. at 704. The court actually based its reversal on a lack of jurisdiction, because the
alleged conduct (excluding the wrongful discharge) was not sufficiently outrageous to justify
the potential for interference with the federal regulatory scheme. Id.
73. While the application of the standard varies from state to state, normally courts require
the conduct to be "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1965).
74. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
75. A good example of conclusory decision-making in this area is Food Fair, Inc. v.
Anderson, 382 So. 2d 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). In that case a woman who had worked
for Food Fair for six years was required by a security officer to submit to a polygraph
examination in connection with his investigation of cash shortages at the store. Company policy
required her to take the test or be fired. The employee also was told that it was company
policy for her to admit to prior thefts, and failure to confess would lead to her discharge for
untrustworthiness. The employee tearfully protested her innocence but finally signed a statement
admitting the theft of $150, a figure suggested by the officer, because she needed the job to
support her family. When her admission of theft did not clear a polygraph test, she was told
to return the next day for another test. The next day she was told to admit a theft of $500;
again the polygraph did not clear. She was then discharged for her admissions of stealing
company cash. Id. at 151-52.
The trial court entered judgment on verdicts for the plaintiff totaling $407,500 in compensatory
and punitive damages. The appellate court simply cited to the outrageousness requirement in
comment d of the Restatement, and then, without any analysis of the facts, stated: "We
conclude that the evidence of the conduct of the defendant England [the security officer] in
the instant case does not meet the test of outrageousness." Id. at 153.
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The most important factor that has been overlooked is the coercion involved
when an employer attempts to force an employee to commit morally repugnant or illegal acts by threatening to discharge him.76 The failure of some
courts to consider the employer's abuse of his powerful position effectively
strips intentional infliction of emotional distress of its most salient protective
feature.
IV.

JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IN FIRINGS AT WILL

Claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the employment
setting nearly always arise from the employee's feeling that he was discharged
unfairly.77 Because such firings also generate actions for wrongful discharge,
judicial application of outrageousness principles depends greatly upon the
court's approach to wrongful discharges. Judicial interpretations of intentional infliction of emotional distress in the employment relationship can be
divided into three categories: courts that do not recognize any wrongful
discharge action; courts that allow liability for wrongful discharge under a
tort or public policy theory; and courts that have adopted an action for
wrongful discharge based on contract principles.

A.

Application of the Tort of Outrage in the Absence
of a Wrongful DischargeCause of Action

Despite the trend in many states toward limiting the absolute right of
employers to fire at will, several courts still refuse to compromise that
traditional rule. 78 Some of these courts have based their refusal to recognize
any wrongful discharge exceptions upon judicial restraint and deference to

76. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. The possibility for coercion through
abuse of a position of authority is greater in the employment setting than in the other contexts
in which it has been applied to find outrageousness (i.e. police officers, school authorities,
landlords, and collecting creditors). The employer has control over the very livelihood of his
employees, and the potential use of this power as a weapon is immense. See Bodewig v. KMart, Inc., 54 Or. App. 480, 635 P.2d 657 (1981); Gomez v. Hug, 7 Kan. App. 2d 603, 645
P.2d 916 (1982). At least one court has held that the relationship between an employer and
an employee imposes upon the employer a higher duty to refrain from inflicting emotional
affronts than exists between two strangers. Hall v. May Dep't Stores, 292 Or. 131, 138, 637
P.2d 126, 131 (1981).
77. The fact that such suits normally arise only following the employee's discharge can be
explained by the employee's natural fear that any suit for improper employer conduct while
still employed may result in immediate discharge. Some employees have nonetheless brought
suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress while still employed by the defendant. See
Milton v. Illinois Bell Tel., 101 II. App. 3d 75, 427 N.E.2d 829 (1981); Bodewig v. K-Mart,
Inc., 54 Or. App. 480, 635 P.2d 657 (1981).
78. See Annot., 12 A.L.R.4TH 544 (1982).
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the legislature to enact such public policy decisions.7 9 Other courts seem
quite comfortable with the absolute right of the employer to discharge
employees, and appear determined to retain the traditional rule despite its
often harsh results.8 0 Litigants faced with this staunch opposition to the
wrongful discharge action have sought to circumvent this rule through use
of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 8' Predictably, these
courts have been unimpressed by this attempt to avoid the employment at
82
will doctrine.
Some courts have emphasized these potential ignoble uses of the tort of
outrage to conclude incorrectly that the failure to win the wrongful discharge
claim necessitates dismissal of the outrageousness claim. 3 Such a conclusory
ruling overlooks the important motive/manner distinction between the two
causes of action. Three recent cases demonstrate the differing analyses that
result when courts recognize, or fail to recognize, the distinction between
the employer's motive for discharge and the manner in which the discharge
84
was implemented.

79. Murphy v. American Home Prods., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 301-02, 448 N.E.2d 86, 89-90, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232, 235-36 (1983). In support of its deference to the legislature in this area the court
noted that employees in New York have already been given statutory protection from firings
for engaging in certain protected activities, including: absence from employment for jury service,
opposing unlawful discriminatory practices or filing a complaint under the Human Rights Law,
and complaining about violations of the Labor Law. The court also noted that legislation has
been proposed but not adopted which would protect employees from termination for (1) taking
actions which benefit the general public or society in general, (2) disclosure of violations of
laws or regulations which pose a substantial and impending danger to public health and safety,
or (3) disclosure of certain illegal or hazardous activities of their employers. Id. at 302 n.1,
448 N.E.2d at 90 n.t, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 236 n.l.
80. See Annot., 86 A.L.R.3D 454 (1978); Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320,
620 P.2d 699 (1980); Catania v. Eastern Airlines, 381 So. 2d 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
Segal v. Arrow Indus. Corp., 364 So. 2d 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Demarco v. Publix
Super Markets, 360 So. 2d 134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
81. More recently, four employees in Minnesota circumvented that state's lack of a wrongful
discharge action by successfully suing their employer for defamation, even though the workers
themselves revealed the charges. Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States,
361 N.W.2d 875 (Minn. App. 1985).
82. The Murphy court stated: "Further, in light of our holding above that there is now
no cause of action in tort in New York for abusive or wrongful discharge of an at-will employee,
plaintiff should not be allowed to evade that conclusion or to subvert the traditional at-will
contract rule by casting his cause of action in terms of a tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress." 58 N.Y.2d at 303, 448 N.E.2d at 90, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
83. For example, in Daniel, where the employee was fired for refusing to drop the company's
name as a defendant in a malpractice suit against the company-owned hospital, the court stated:
"We conclude that Magma was neither liable in tort nor in contract for discharging Mr. Daniel.
Since his termination was lawful, any recovery for intentional infliction of mental distress based
upon the wrongful discharge must also fail." 127 Ariz. at 324, 620 P.2d at 703. It is interesting
to note the stakes involved in such a decision: the jury verdict had awarded the plaintiff and
his wife $150,000 for breach of employment contract and unlawful discharge, $26,000 for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and $500,000 punitive damages. The court of appeals
reversed, and the plaintiffs recovered nothing. Id. See also Brooks v. Carolina Tel., 56 N.C.
App. 801, 290 S.E.2d 370 (1982).
84. Mundy v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 676 F.2d 503 (11th Cir. 1982); Milton v. Illinois
Bell Tel., 101 11. App. 3d 75, 427 N.E.2d 829 (1981); M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269,
596 S.W.2d 681 (1980).
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In Mundy v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph, 5 the plaintiff alleged
that management personnel of the telephone company had attempted to
force him to participate in a scheme of falsifying reports in order to embezzle
money from the utility and its ratepayers 6 The plaintiff's refusal to engage
in this illicit scheme allegedly precipitated a pattern of harassment which
included: giving the plaintiff less desirable assignments than those who participated in the scheme; inaccurate and unfair evaluations of the plaintiff's
work; arbitrary denial of business expenses incurred; and attempts to damage
the plaintiff's credibility among his peers and subordinates.8 7 The plaintiff
eventually resigned because of this harrassment.
After resigning, the plaintiff brought suit against his employer claiming
in part wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 8
The wrongful discharge claim was dismissed immediately because Florida
strictly adheres to the employment at will doctrine. 89 The Florida appellate
court also summarily upheld the dismissal of the outrageousness claim. 90 The
court found it unnecessary or improper to consider either the employer's
blatant cbercion or the result that the court's decision might have on the
continuation of such employer practices. The court in Mundy correctly
decided that the outrageousness claim did not fail automatically when the
wrongful discharge action was lost.9' However, the court effectively gutted
the plaintiff's case by failing to give proper emphasis to the extremely
stressful impact of the employer's coercion.
In other states, the lack of a valid wrongful discharge claim has not
precipitated such a summary dismissal of the claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. 92 Instead, these courts closely examine the manner in
which the employer effectuated the valid discharge, with particular emphasis
by the
on attempted coercion by the employer.9 This approach was used
94
Appellate Court of Illinois in Milton v. Illinois Bell Telephone.
In Milton, as in Mundy, the plaintiff claimed that management personnel
had repeatedly demanded that he falsify work reports in order to overcharge
customers. 95 When the plaintiff refused to succumb to these demands, he
was subjected to an extensive course of retaliation. 96 The plaintiff in Milton,

85. 676 F.2d 503.
86. Id. at 503-04.
87. Id. at 504.

88. Id. at 504 n.1.
89. Id.
90. The court stated that no Florida case had upheld such a claim against a former employee

despite the existence of "claims no less compelling than Mundy's." Id. at 505-06.
91. Cf. supra notes 43, 69 & 83 and accompanying text.
92. Milton, 101 111.
App. 3d 75, 427 N.E.2d 829; Counce, 26.8 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681.

93. Id.

94. 101 111.
App. 3d 75, 427 N.E.2d 829.

95. Id. at 77, 427 N.E.2d at 831.

96. This harrassment included, among other things, giving the plaintiff undesirable and
unprofitable assignments, criticizing plaintiff's work, arbitrarily transferring plaintiff from job
to job to fatigue him, misleading customers about plaintiff's capability and integrity, and
arbitrarily denying plaintiff "distress leave" and reserve week leave. Id. at 77-78, 427 N.E.2d

at 831.

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:365

unlike the one in Mundy, chose not to resign. Milton continued to work
for Illinois Bell, but sued the company for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Since the plaintiff was still employed by Illinois Bell, no wrongful
discharge remedy was available. 97
Unlike the court in Mundy, the Appellate Court of Illinois did not balk
at the absence of the wrongful discharge action. Instead, the court undertook
a probing analysis of the outrageousness of the employer's conduct. The
court recognized that the defendant's evil motive alone was insufficient to
show the requisite degree of outrageousness. But the court also discerned
the importance of the potentially coercive context in which the employer's
retaliatory conduct occurred. 98 In examining the employer's behavior the
court gave proper emphasis to its coercive effect:
As Dean Prosser pointed out, "The extreme and outrageous nature
of the conduct may arise not so much from what is done as from abuse
by the defendant of some relation or position which gives him actual or
apparent power to damage the plaintiff's interests. The result is something
very like extortion." ... The Supreme Court acknowledged that "relatively immobile workers who often have no other place to market their
skills," do not stand on equal footing with the large corporations which
employ them.... It is the alleged abuse of power by a large corporation
over one of its front-line employees which aggravates the outrageousness
of the conduct alleged in this case.9
The court then weighed the employer's conduct1 00 against the employer's
interest in demanding that an employee falsify reports, and found that the
employer's interest merited no legal deference.' 0' This analysis led the court
to conclude that a jury could reasonably find that the coercion and retaliation
in this case were outrageous enough to be intolerable in a civilized community. 0 2 The court emphasized the need for the tort of outrage to protect
employees who have not been discharged: "[I]f employers were permitted
to intentionally inflict severe emotional distress on employees who refuse to
violate clearly mandated public policies, the protection afforded by the

97. Had the employee been discharged or forced to resign, a wrongful discharge action
probably would have been successful in light of the Illinois Supreme Court decision in Palmateer
v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
98. 101 Ill. App. 3d at 79, 427 N.E.2d at 832. Had the employer simply requested the
plaintiff to join in this scheme, but engaged in no retaliation upon his refusal, the plaintiff
would have had no cause of action. Therefore, the court focused on the manner through which
the employer sought to implement the scheme, not the motive for his behavior. Implicit in the
court's willingness to consider the coercive context of this situation is its recognition that the
motive for the employer's coercion was improper, and therefore not within the manager's
prerogative.
99. Id. (citations omitted).
100. See supra note 96.

101. 101 Ill.
App. 3d at 80, 427 N.E.2d at 833. This balancing of the employer's interest
may lead to different results when actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress
accompany rightful discharges, since the employer's motive for the coercion may then be entitled
to deference as part of his managerial function.
102. Id. at 81, 427 N.E.2d at 833.
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Supreme Court's decision in Palmateer[adopting the public policy exception
to the at will rule] would be undermined."' °3
The Milton court recognized that a valid claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress could arise from an employer's coercion which preceded
any discharge of the employee. Other courts similarly have found that even
when the plaintiff's discharge was valid, intentional infliction of emotional
distress can result from the employer's conduct after the firing.' °4 In M.B.M.
Co. v. Counce,05 the plaintiff purportedly was laid off because her services
as a waitress were no longer needed. There was some question about the
real reason for the discharge since the employer was advertising for counter
help when the plaintiff was released.2 6 The court found no wrongful discharge because the reason (or motive) for the discharge did not violate any
well-established public policy.10 7 After the plaintiff had been fired, her
supervisor forced her to submit to a polygraph test concerning a money
shortage on her last day of work. Even though she passed the polygraph
test, her employer deducted part of the cash shortage from her last paycheck. 1' The plaintiff was later denied unemployment benefits because her
employer told the Employment Security Division that she had been laid off
due to numerous customer complaints.' 9
The Arkansas Supreme Court found that summary judgment should not
have been granted on the plaintiff's tort of outrage claim. The court stated:
Ms. Counce has no cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress because of [the employer's] action in discharging her, because
[the employer] is not liable for doing that which it had the legal right
to do....
M.B.M. s conduct subsequent to her discharge is a different matter."0

The court emphasized the employer's position of power which continued
after the discharge with respect to the plaintiff's entitlement to backpay
and unemployment compensation."' The court concluded that a reasonable
jury could find that the employer's conduct in this coercive context was
outrageous."12
The courts in Milton and Counce gave proper emphasis to the employer's
coercive conduct before and after the discharge, thereby making possible
recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the absence of a

103. Id. (citing Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 I11.2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 816

(1981)).
104. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681; Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 603 P.2d
58, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1979).
105. 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681.
106. Id. at 272, 596 S.W.2d at 683.
107. Id. at 273, 596 S.W.2d at 683-84.
108. Id. at 271-72, 596 S.W.2d at 683.
109. Id. at 272, 596 S.W.2d at 683.
110. Id. at 280-81, 596 S.W.2d at 688 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
111. Id. at 281, 596 S.W.2d at 688.
112. Id.
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wrongful discharge action. However, even if all courts used this approach,
the usefulness of the tort of outrage would continue to vary greatly from
state to state, because courts differ in their views of what is outrageous.
State courts that strictly adhere to the traditional at will doctrine also tend
to have very tough standards for outrageousness." 3 In those states, the
difficult outrageousness standard can be expected to leave employees equally
vulnerable to an employer's abusive manner of discharge as they are to an
employer's improper motive for termination. On the other hand, states that
have adopted some form of wrongful discharge exception tend to have more
lenient outrageousness standards."l 4 In these states, an action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress is more likely to provide compensation to
and protection for employees who are discharged in an outrageous manner.
Even in the absence of a wrongful discharge, the tort of outrage can assure
for employees in these states at least "minimal levels of civility""' in the

employer's conduct surrounding the discharge. 1 6 Intentional infliction of
emotional distress assumes even greater importance in situations where the
employer's pattern of harassment and coercion has stopped short of the
ultimate discharge sanction.' 7 In these instances, the tort of outrage provides
the employee's only protection from the employer's coercive abuse of his
position of authority.
B. Application of the Tort of Outrage
in Conjunction with Wrongful Discharges
Based on Tort and Public Policy Theories
The discussion above has demonstrated that intentional infliction of emotional distress may provide employees some protection from outrageous
conduct surrounding a discharge even where no wrongful discharge action
is available, and may be especially useful in cases where no discharge has
yet occurred. The complexion of the situation changes if the courts already
provide a remedy under a public policy exception to the at will doctrine. In
states that have adopted the public policy exception, the resulting tort remedy
brings into serious question the need for an additional action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
The tort theory of wrongful discharge was created to prevent firings in
retaliation for exercising some substantial public policy right."18 Courts and
commentators differ as to whether that right must be explicitly stated in
legislation or whether it can be found through a general consideration of

113. See supra note 75.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See Agarwal, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 603 P.2d 58, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141.
Givelber, supra note 6, at 68.
See Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681.
Milton, 101 Il.App. 3d 75, 427 N.E.2d 829.
See Annot., 12 A.L.R.4ATH 544 (1982).
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the public interest." 9 Under either standard, if the court decides that the
employee was wrongfully discharged most courts will provide a tort remedy.120 The action lies in tort because the employer's obligation to refrain
from firing an employee does not depend upon any express or implied
promise in the employment contract but rather is imposed by law upon all
employers in order to implement the state's public policies. 2 Like any other
tort action, the remedy entitles the plaintiff to compensatory damages, including emotional distress, and under proper circumstances, punitive damages.'" The availability of full tort damages under the wrongful discharge
cause of action may make superfluous an additional claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
In two separate decisions of the case of Harless v. FirstNational Bank,'
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals undertook a lengthy analysis
of the utility of the tort of outrage in light of the similar damages already
available through a wrongful discharge suit. In that case a bank employee
claimed that he was harrassed, threatened, and later dismissed because of
his efforts to alert his employer to the bank's violations of state and federal
consumer credit laws.'2 The state supreme court had decided, in a previous
decision of the case limited only to the issue of liability, that these facts
constituted a wrongful discharge.12 In that opinion, the court stated that
"where the employer's motivation for the discharge contravenes some substantial public policy principle, then the employer may be liable to the
employee for damages occasioned by the discharge.' ' 26 The second Harless
decision discussed only the propriety of the trial court's damages. 27 In
determining the correct damages, the court first discussed whether emotional
damages were appropriate for a wrongful discharge. It found that under its
tort theory of wrongful discharge there was sufficient intent to inflict harm
to allow emotional damages even in the absence of any visible physical
119. See O'Neill v. A.R.A. Servs., 457 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Martin v. Platt,
386 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Edwards v. Citibank, 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d
269 (Sup. Ct. 1979); Brake, supra note 2; Note, Employment at Will: A Proposal to Adopt
the PublicPolicy Exemption in Florida, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 614 (1981-82); Wrongful Discharge,
supra note 2; cf. Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876; Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246
S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Harless (I)].
120. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr.
839 (1980); Kelsay v. Motorola Inc., 74 II. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Harless (I), 246
S.E.2d 270.
121. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
122. Id.
123. Harless (I), 246 S.E.2d 270; Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 289 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Harless (11)].
124. Harless (II), 289 S.E.2d at 696. Plaintiff was fired 18 months after his initial complaint
of such violations. While no reason was given for his discharge, plaintiff asserted that it was
due solely to his efforts to gain compliance with the consumer credit laws of West Virginia
and the United States. Id.
125. Harless (I), 246 S.E.2d 270.
126. Id. at 275.
127. Harless (I1), 289 S.E.2d 692.
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injury.1 28 The court, however, recognized that emotional damages absent any
demonstrable physical trauma left the jury a rather open hand in assessing
damages. These damages, as a result, could assume the cloak of punitive
damages. 29 Because of this punitive element of emotional damages and the
lack of any egregious conduct beyond the firing, the court rejected the
punitive damages claim.130
Even though the court refused to impose punitive damages on the facts
of Harless, in dicta, the court did "recognize that where the employer's
conduct is wanton, willful or malicious, punitive damages may be appropriate.'' The court illustrated the conduct to which it referred in a footnote:
Such a situation may arise where the employer circulates false or
malicious rumors about the employee before or after the discharge or
engages in a concerted action of harassment to induce the employee to
quit or actively
interferes with the employee's ability to find other em32
ployment.

In deciding whether to award punitive damages, the court did not focus on
the motive for the firing, which is the criterion for wrongful discharge
liability.' 3 Instead, the court looked to the manner of, and the conduct

surrounding, the discharge. 3 4 These are the same considerations that form

the basis of the action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.135 In
light of the fact that the court considered the same conduct for punitive
damages that it normally would weigh in an outrageousness claim, it is
hardly surprising that the court concluded that, "in this jurisdiction, a claim
for the tort of outrageous conduct is duplicitous to a claim for retaliatory
discharge.' 3 6 The court recognized the need for protection of employees
from outrageous conduct surrounding the discharge, but chose to provide
compensation via punitive damages rather than through intentional infliction
37
of emotional distress.
128. Id. at 701-02.
129. Id. at 702. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
130. Id. at 702-03.
131. Id.at 703.
132. Id.at 703 n.19.
133. Since the motive for the discharge must be contrary to public policy for the discharge
to be wrongful, this improper motive cannot constitute the malicious, willful, or wanton conduct
required for punitive damages.
134. "The mere existence of a retaliatory discharge will not automatically give rise to the
right to punitive damages. The plaintiff must prove further egregious conduct on the part of
the employer." Harless (II), 289 S.E.2d at 703.
135. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
136. Harless (II), 289 S.E.2d at 705. "The damages are essentially the same under both
claims since we recognize that if the employer's conduct is outrageous punitive damages may
be recovered in a retaliatory discharge suit as well as compensatory damages including an award
for emotional distress." Id.
137. The court recognized the fundamental difference between wrongful discharge, which is
actionable because the firing itself contravenes a substantial public policy, and the tort of
outrageousness, which is based on the socially intolerable conduct of the employer in effectuating
the discharge. Id. Nevertheless, the court concluded, "the retaliatory discharge cause of action,
depending on the facts, is sufficiently accommodating to include outrageous conduct such that
there is no need to permit an independent cause of action for outrageous conduct in a retaliatory
discharge case." Id. The court noted, however, that "[t]here may be situations where the
plaintiff has not been discharged or his termination of employment cannot be fitted into a
retaliatory discharge cause of action, yet a cause of action will fall within the tort of outrageous
conduct as against his employer." Id. at 705 n.22. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying
text.
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3
Although no other state court has yet adopted this approach, s its reasoning and results are persuasive. Other courts applying the tort theory of
wrongful discharge also have made punitive damages contingent upon a
showing of malicious, willful or wanton conduct by the defendant, but none
39
has stated what conduct would qualify for such punishment.' It is possible
that these courts intend punitive damages to be automatic in cases involving
a willful discharge for an improper motive.14° Such an approach would be
based on a belief that emotional damages will not sufficiently deter employers
from discharging employees in violation of the state's public policies, thereby
making punitive damages a necessity in every wrongful discharge. However,
the allowance of punitive damages for every wrongful discharge may be
overly harsh to employers, especially given the fact that they do not always
have close control over the individuals who implement the discharge. The
Harless approach, on the other hand, more closely matches the damages
awarded to the approximate harm of the employer's action, while still pro4
viding an economic deterrent in the form of emotional damages.' ' The
Harless approach also provides employees some compensation for any excessive harassment or coercion which may precede or follow the discharge.
The use of punitive damages instead of a separate action for the tort of
outrage makes little difference in the remedy since intentional infliction of
emotional distress, like punitive damages, commonly computes damages
42
Application of
according to the culpability of the defendant's conduct.
the punitive damages standard of maliciousness, instead of the more difficult
outrageousness test, also may allow more employees to recover. This more
lenient standard may indirectly account for the employer's potential to inflict
stress on his subservient employees. The Harless approach appears to adequately protect the interests of both parties while simplifying the case by
making unnecessary the additional action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

C.

Application of the Tort of Outrage in Conjunction with
Wrongful DischargeActions Based on Contract Theories

While wrongful discharge cases most commonly arise under a tort theory,
some courts allow recovery under a contract theory for breach of an implied

138. At least one other court has found that no separate action was necessary for emotional
distress, given the availability of emotional damages for wrongful discharge under Indiana law.
The court did not consider the propriety of punitive damages for the outrageous manner
through which the discharge was implemented. Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp.
1387, 1391 (S.D. Ind. 1982).
139. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839; Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d 172,
384 N.E.2d 353. The court in Kelsay suggests that absent punitive damages employers would
be very willing to wrongfully discharge employees, because compensatory damages alone (not
including emotional damages in that case) would be too small to pose any real economic
deterrent. Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 186-87, 384 N.E.2d at 359. However, in Kelsay no punitive
damages were awarded because the decision was a novel one, and the defendant was not aware
of the potential for such punishment. Id. at 187-88, 384 N.E.2d at 360.
140. See Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982).
141. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
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Courts have found contractual wrongful discharges

under three theories. Some courts recognize a contractual action for a discharge in violation of a substantial public policy. 144 More often courts will
imply from general assurances of job security a promise by the employer to

discharge only for just cause.145 More recently, a few courts have expanded
the wrongful discharge action to its furthest point by allowing a contract
action for a discharge in violation of an implied convenant of good faith
and fair dealing.'" Because contract damages typically do not include either
emotional or punitive damages, there appears to be a void that in certain
instances could be filled by use of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

These contractual wrongful discharge actions could also be framed as tort
actions if courts were willing to label the employer's discharge as a violation
of public policy rather than a mere breach of contract.

47

In fact, the

California courts have stated that even a violation of the obligation of good
faith and fair dealing sounds in both tort and contract, and may give rise
to emotional distress and punitive damages. 48 The limitation to a contractual
remedy may be a result of judicial caution while exploring the boundaries
of the wrongful discharge action. Courts recognize that the standard of good

faith and fair dealing is admittedly vague, and that imposition of a just
cause requirement through a construction of prior representations also may

lead to unforeseeable liability for employers. Also, in light of the unpredictability of recent expansions in this area, the courts are less likely to
expose the employer tQ the full range of liability. Furthermore, the behavior
constituting a contractual wrongful discharge may be less deplorable than
that which undermines a significant state public policy.
In Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 149 which first adopted the contractual

remedy for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the court
had little difficulty adhering to the restricted contractual remedy. The court

143. See Annot., 12 A.L.R.4TH 544 (1982).
144. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980); McNulty v.

Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
145. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Cleary
v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); Wagner v. Sperry
Univac, 458 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd without op., 624 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir. 1980);
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
146. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Monge
v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). While some courts have stated that
these cases essentially impose a just cause requirement for discharge upon employers, this has
been explicitly disavowed, at least in Massachusetts. Gram v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 384
Mass. 659, 429 N.E.2d 21 (1981).
147. In fact, Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. actually phrases its holding in language which
could be considered a broad public policy exception: "We hold that a termination by the
employer of a contract of employment at will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or
based on retaliation is not in the best interest of the economic system or the public good and
constitutes a breach of the employment contract." 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 551
(1974).
148. Cancellier, 672 F.2d at 1318.
149. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549.
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in that case stated that damages for mental suffering are not generally
recoverable in contract actions. 5 Yet, the court felt compelled to justify the
limited remedy by noting that the employee's mental suffering may have been
attributable more to her marital difficulties than to her discharge.' 5' Courts
may be tempted to abandon the strict contract remedy when confronted with
a plaintiff that clearly has suffered substantial emotional distress because of
the manner of discharge. For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
in Agis v. Howard Johnson Co.5 2 essentially filled the void in the limited
contractual remedy by allowing a discharged employee to state a claim for
intentional or reckless infliction of severe emotional distress. In that case,
the plaintiff and her fellow waitresses were called to a meeting at which
53
their employer informed them that "there was some stealing going on.'
The employer then stated that since he did not know the identity of the
persons responsible, he would begin firing all the present waitresses in alphabetical order, starting with the plaintiff, Debra Agis.' 5 4 The employer
then carried out his threat and discharged the plaintiff. The court concluded
that the employer's conduct was such that a jury could reasonably find it
extreme and outrageous, and the cause of plaintiff's severe emotional distress. '"
The finding of intentional infliction of emotional distress in Agis for this
single incident appears to ease the traditionally stringent outrageousness
standard.' 5 6 This decision, however, must be viewed in the light of Massachusetts' limited wrongful discharge remedy' 7 which would otherwise leave
this plaintiff uncompensated for her substantial emotional injuries. 58 Furthermore, the court in Agis apparently looked to the manner in which the
employer implemented the discharge, rather than any improper motive, since
the complaint did not allege any illicit motivation.' 9 The discharge was part
of a scheme intended to coerce a confession from the guilty party by inflicting
stress upon the entire group. The attempted coercion by the employer and
the absolute helplessness of the plaintiff greatly exacerbated the outrageousness of the employer's conduct.
The finding in Agis demonstrates the potential utility of the intentional
infliction of emotional distress remedy in protecting plaintiffs from emotional
suffering that may result from the outrageous manner in which a discharge
is implemented. While injury from such conduct is already protected by

150. Id. at 134, 316 A.2d at 552.
151. Id.
152. 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976).
153. Id. at 141, 355 N.E.2d at 317.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 145, 355 N.E.2d at 319.
156. See Givelber, supra note 6, at 66.
157. See Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
158. In states recognizing the tort remedy for wrongful discharge, the firing in Agis may
have violated the policy against self-help enforcement of criminal statutes.
159. Agis, 371 Mass. at 141-42, 355 N.E.2d at 317.
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punitive damages under the Harless rule, '6° the limited contractual remedy
under the new good faith and fair dealing limitation makes the tort of
outrage a necessary action to complement that remedy. These courts must
maintain the distinction between the manner and motive for the discharge
in these cases to avoid discarding the cautious contract remedy which is
warranted in the new frontiers of the wrongful discharge action.' 6'
CONCLUSION

An overview of the various applications of intentional infliction of emotional distress in the employment at will context has shown that this rather
amorphous tort is a useful supplement to the expanding wrongful discharge
exceptions. The emphasis of the tort of outrage upon the manner in which
the employer effectuates the discharge illuminates the need for protection
and compensation for emotional harm which results not from the firing
itself, but from the conduct which precedes or follows it. The action's greatest
utility exists when it is used to deter the use of extremely stressful coercion
by an employer who seeks to undermine state public policy goals at the
expense of his employees.
In practice, the tort of outrage may become unnecessary in states which
use punitive damages to compensate employees for, and deter employers
from, outrageous conduct surrounding the traumatic discharge. Its practical
utility may also be limited in strict at will states because of the nearly
insurmountable outrageousness standard in those states. However, intentional
infliction of emotional distress is a necessary complement to the limited
contractual remedy for the breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. The action may also provide employees needed protection
from coercive conduct surrounding a valid discharge. Most importantly, the
availability of the tort of outrage is imperative in cases of coercion and
harassment, in which the employee has not been discharged. In such cases
intentional infliction of emotional distress ensures that the protections secured
by the wrongful discharge action are not circumvented by employer coercion
which stops just short of the ultimate discharge sanction.
JAMEs F. BLEEIKE

160. See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
161. The complementary nature of the tort of outrage has been noted in other contexts where
the remedy is otherwise limited:
Since monetary damages under Title VII are limited to recovery of back pay,
alternate causes of action under state law may be particularly important where
the discriminatee might recover damages other than back pay. ...
In certain factual situations an employee may be able to recover damages for
the intentional and unreasonable infliction of mental or emotional distress.
B. Scm.Ei & P. GROSSAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 678-80 (1976).

